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"revolutionary" elements in the Middle East, and if we could encourage
the King and the Libyan Government to tackle internal problems we might
help to ensure the continuance of a pro-Western regine even after the
King's death. Moreover, the United States Government, who also hoped to
keep their existing facilities at Wheelus air base, were most anxious
that we should not withdraw completely from Cyrenaica. The financial
implications of the alternative choices available to us were small.
In these circumstances HM Ambassador should be instructed that in
the forthcoming negotiations with the Libyan Government, our aims should
be, firstly, to withdraw from Benghazi, preferably before the end of
1967, while leaving the question of withdrawal from El Aden and Tobruk
upen until that of withdrawal from Benghazi was settled, and then probe
Libyan intentions. At the same time he should seek to persuade the
King that Libya's integrity needed first to be safeguarded by her own
security forces and that the requirement for British troops to protect
Libya's frontiers was no longer realistic. He should also agree, if
the Libyans so wished, that British military and naval missions in Libya
should be retained. In negotiation our Ambassador should be allowed
as much flexibility as possible.
In discussion there was general agreement with the Foreign
Secretary's recommendations.
The Committee
J
Approved OPD(67) 64.
8
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